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HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT
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C. Timothy Hopkins, ISBN 1064
Sean 1. Coletti, ISBN 7199
428 Park Avenue
P. O. Box 51219
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219
Telephone: 208-523-4445
Attomeys for Appellants
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/dJt
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998;
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a
Califomia limited liability company;
CALEB FOOTE, an individual,
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an
individual, JOHN KEVIN
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB,
INC., a California corporation;

Docket No. 37869
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company; GORDON ARA VE,
individually and as Member of High
Mark Development, LLC; JARED
ARA VE, individually and as Member
of High Mark Development, LLC;
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually
and as Member of High Mark
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES
I-X,
Defendants-Res ondents.
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COME NOW the above-named Appellants, by and through their counsel of
record, Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, pursuant to Rule 42 of the
Idaho Appellate Rules, and submit this Brief in support of their Petition for Rehearing
related to matters in this Court's decision filed April 26, 2012, affinning the Decision and
Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District for the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Bonneville, entered May 28,2010.
INTRODUCTION
In this Petition for Rehearing, Appellants respectfully request that the Court
rehear this case for the following reasons:
1. In its analysis of fraud, could the jury reasonably find statements in the
Estoppel Certificate regarding the payment of rent to be true, while totally disregarding a
contrary jury instruction?
2. Should this Court have addressed Appellants' arguments regarding fraud
by nondisclosure?
3. Couldn't the Appellants seek contractual, legal or equitable remedies
after signing the Purchase and Sale Agreement if they subsequently learned that High
Mark breached the Agreement by providing false infonnation?
4. In view of evidence showing the Appellants did not know the tenant was
not paying rent, was it reasonable to conclude that the Appellants would nonetheless have
purchased the property had they known the tenant was not paying rent?
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5. Was it procedurally proper for the trial court to analyze Appellant's
Motion for New Trial by failing to consider any of the facts presented by the Appellant at
trial?
ARGUMENT
1.

The jury could not have reasonably concluded that statements in the

Income and Expense Statement and Estoppel Certificate regarding the payment of rent
"were truthfuL"
In this Court's April 26, 2012 Opinion in O'Shea v. High Mark
Development, on the issue of fraud, the Court concluded that "the jury could have found
that the Center did not fail to pay six month's rent. It borrowed money from Gordon
Arave and Jared Arave to pay that rent." O'Shea, 2012 Opinion No. 67, slip op. at 7.
"Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors could have concluded
that the statements in the Income and Expense Statement and the Estoppel Certificate
were truthfuL" Id.
However, the trial court instructed the jury, in Instruction No. 31, as
follows:
The Court also previously found that the Lease Estoppel
Certificate did not contain accurate infonnation, that is,
representations that the Lease had not been modified,
supplemented, altered or amended, and representations that
all minimum monthly rent had been paid, were not accurate [.]
R., p. 1329M. This Court did not consider the language in Instruction No. 31 significant
in its analysis of fraud, explaining that the trial court "did not include a similar instruction
when instructing the jury on fraud." O'Shea, p. 8, n.2.
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The Court's decision in that respect is contrary to its own precedent
regarding jury instructions. "It is axiomatic and fundamental that the jury must take the
law from the instructions given[.]" McNichols v. Simplot Co., 74 Idaho 321,327,262
P.2d 1012 (1953). "[T]he refusal to give a particular requested instruction is not
erroneous where the substance of the proposed instruction is covered elsewhere in the
instructions given." Boll v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 334, 339-40, 92
P.3d 1081 (2004); see also Quincy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 41, Benewah County, 102
Idaho 756, 769, 640 P .2d 304 (1981) (holding that the trial court did not err when it
"found it was unnecessary to instruct the jury again on the undisputed facts."). Jury
instructions are to be reviewed "as a whole" to determine whether they fairly and
adequately present the issues and state the law. Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 185,
219 P.3d 1192 (2009).
The language in Instruction 31 that the "representations that all minimum
monthly rent had been paid, were not accurate" was the law of the case. It was not
necessary for the same language to appear in a fraud instruction, as it was "covered
elsewhere in the instructions given" and the instructions were to be viewed "as a whole."
The trial court properly instructed the jury on that point, stating that the jury "must
consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others." R., p. 1329B
(Instruction No.2).
The jury had to conclude that the statements in the Estoppel Certificate
regarding the payment of rent were "not accurate." It could not reasonably have come to
two inconsistent factual conclusions regarding the truthfulness of the Estoppel
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Certificate. In other words, the same Janguage in the Estoppel Certificate that was
inaccurate in the breach of contract context could not reasonably have been considered to
be accurate in the fraud context. It could not be both "true" and "untrue" that all
minimum monthly rent had been paid.
Furthermore, the inaccurate message that all monthJy rent had been paid
was also conveyed by the Income and Expense Statement.

.s§~

Exh. 20 (stating, under

the title "Idaho Falls Childrens Center", that "Rent Received from 612006 through

7/2001" was $324,836 . 00.). This message was false in any context, regardless of where
in the instructions the statement regarding its falsity existed. The Estoppel Certificate
and Income and Expense Statement both contained information that led Appellants to
believe that the property was income-producing as advertised, when, in fact, the tenant's
obligation to pay several months' rent had simply been "released." Exh. )3,.,.
FinaHy, this Court commented in its Opinion that the trial court's finding of
breach of contract was not based upon the same evidence presented at trial.

Q~Shea,

p.

16. This, however, does not change the fact that the jury was instructed that (a) the
Estoppel Certificate contained false infonnation, and (b) such information constituted a
breach of contract. The jury was not entitled to disregard such an instmction even with
new evidence.
Appellants respectfulJy request that this Court rehear argument concerning
the fraud, nondisclosure, and breach of contract issues, as all are affected by this analysis.
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2.

Appellants did raise the issues of nondisclosure and inadequacy of

the jury instruction on that subject sufficient for the Court to review both on appeal.
In its Opinion the Court refused to address fraud by nondisclosure,
declaring that the Appellants had not argued it on appeal. The Court also refused to
consider error injury instruction No. 34 for the same reason. The Court stated, "[w]e
will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by argument and
propositions of law." O'Shea, pp. 4, 15,20 (quoting Ingma v. Boise County ex reI. Bd.
OfComm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450 (2003)).
The requirement in Lnama is set forth in the Appellate Rules, LA.R.
35(a)(6), which provides as follows:
(6) Argument. The argument shall contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations and
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record
relied upon.
Rule 35(a)(6) does not require arguments be divided into separate sections, and does not
limit the Court from considering arguments in support of the issues presented on appeal
wherever they appear within the brief. Appellants respectfully assert that they argued
issues of nondisclosure throughout their Brief, and argued the factual bases for the jury
instruction argument, complying in each instance with the requirements of the Rule.
a.

Nondisclosure.

Appellants identified what infonnation was not disclosed, including the
"Center's failure to pay rent from September 2006 through February 2007, the Center's
signing of a promissory note for the unpaid rent, the failure to pay rent for October and
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November 2007, and the November 7,2007 promissory note for unpaid rentr.]"
Appellants' Brief, p. 16. The trial court held, however, that the jury could have
concluded the undisclosed information "was not so vital, material and unknown that it
should have been timely disclosed." Id. (citing R., p. 1418-21).
In their Argument, Appellants strenuously disagreed with the trial court's
detennination that the undisclosed information was not "material" or "unknown":
Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict on the
fraud claims, whether analyzed subjectively or objectively.
Subjectively, each Appellant's trial testimony was that they
would not have decided to purchase the property if they had
known about the nonpayment of rent. Furthermore, based
upon the language of the Estoppel Certificate, Respondents
knew or had reason to know that the Appellants believed rent
payment . . . [was] important in determining whether to
purchase the property....
Objectively, there was no evidence presented at trial
that the nonpayment of rent by a tenant would not be
important to a purchaser of a property expecting a goodpaying tenant.
The District Court did not analyze,
su~jectively, whether the Respondents should have believed
that nonpayment of rent would have been important to the
Appellants, or objectively, where this information would be
impOliant to any reasonable person ....
Appellants' Brief, p. 25.
The undisclosed infonnation was certainly unknown, however "with
respect to the allegations of ... fraud by nondisclosure, the trial court's failure to look at
the evidence again affected its decision. The elements of materiality, knowledge of
falsity, justifiable reliance, and resultant injury are all connected to whether or not the
infonnation made available to the Appellants actually disclosed the inaccuracy of the
misrepresentations." Id., p. 23.
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Citing Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998) and Sowards v.
Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000), the Appellants argued that the Respondents
had a duty to disclose certain documents, due to Respondents' representations that the
tenant was paying its monthly rent:
Under Watts and Sowards, High Mark had an
affinnative duty to disclose the evidence of promissory notes
which materially altered the rent payment responsibilities of
the Center, as stated in the Lease Agreement. These included
not only the April 18, 2007 promissory note, but also the
November 7, 2007 promissory note, signed after the Estoppel
Certificate had been provided to Appellants.
This
'subsequent information' made High Mark's previous
representation 'untrue or misleading.' High Mark also had a
duty to disclose that 'all minimum monthly rent' had in fact
not been paid, in order 'to prevent a partial or ambiguous
statement of fact from becoming misleading.' As previously
stated, this 'information ... [was] not already in possession of
the other patiY."
Appellants' Brief, p. 34.
In its Opinion, this Court found that the Estoppel Celiificate and Income
and Expense Statement did not "purport to represent whether the Center had paid rent in
October November, or December 2007." O'Shea, p. 13. However, this does not consider
the context in which these documents were sent to the Appellants, together with the
context of the nondisclosures. Context is critical to a determination of whether a
nondisclosure is in fact misleading.
The critical message of the Estoppel Certificate and the Income and
Expense Statement to the Appellants was, simply, that the "property being sold and
purchased as an income-producing propeliy was actually producing the income
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represented." O'Shea, p. 32 (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This message was
the very heart of the transaction, as Appellants had sought to purchase an incomeproducing property.
The message that the property was income-producing created in the
Respondents a duty to disclose under the situations summarized in Watts. First,
Respondents' nondisclosure made their "partial statements" in the Estoppel Certificate
and Income and Expense Statement even more "misleading" because the message those
documents conveyed--the tenant was paying rent and the property was incomeproducing-was not true. Watts, 131 Idaho at 620 (situation (b)).
Second, "subsequent information" in the November 2007 note made the
message of the earlier Estoppel and Income and Expense Statement "misleading," as the
tenant was, in fact, not paying its rent. Three months of nonpayment in October,
November and December 2007, just prior to the purchase, should have led Respondents
to disclose that the property was not income-producing as advertised. Id. (situation (c)).
Third, Respondents knew that the message of the Estoppel and Income and
Expense Statement was not entirely accurate when these documents were provided to the
Appellants, due to the fact that the tenant had already replaced payment for several
months of rent for 2006 and 2007 with the April 2007 Note, which was forgiven
simultaneously with the tenant signing the Estoppel. The failure to provide Appellants
any context to the rent representations in both documents meant that the Appellants were
left to rely on an inaccurate representation in buying the property. Id. (situation (d)).
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"A duty to speak arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal
terms or where information to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other
party." Id. Appellants did not deal on equal terms with the Respondents with regard to
Respondents' private dealings with the tenant, and did not have in their possession either
of the two promissory notes. Furthermore, Respondents knew that Appellants did not
have these documents or any explanation for their existence.
This Court has previously held that "silence, in circumstances where a
prospective purchaser might be led to harmful conclusions, is a fonn of
'representation[.]'" Watts, 131 Idaho at 621 (quoting Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708,
571 P.2d 769 (1977)); see also

O'Sh~1!,

slip op at 22 (1. Jones, J., dissenting opinion)

("[fJraud is fraud, and this Court has not previously drawn a clear distinction between
fraud involving nondisclosure of a material fact and fraud involving an affirmative
misrepresentation."). Appellants addressed affirmative fraud and nondisclosure together
in sections of their Brief (pp. 18-24), but this should not have been prejudicial to their
nondisclosure argument. These nondisclosures by the Respondents were material, and it
was enor for the trial court not to consider them properly on post-trial motions. This
Court should have considered those arguments.
b.

Facts Supporting the Argument on the Jury Instruction on
Fraud by Nondisclosure.

In Section CA of the Am2el1ants' Brief (pages 33 through 35), Appellants
identified the situations in which a duty to disclose existed, and also the facts which the
Respondents failed to disclose. Specifically, Appellants stated the law from Watts and
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Sowards, specified the items the Respondents had a duty to disclose under Watts and
Sowards (including the "existence of promissory notes which materially altered the rent
payment responsibilities of the Center[;]" the "April 18,2007 promissory note[;]" the
"November 7, 2007 promissory note[;]" and that "all minimum monthly rent had not
been paid"), and argued why these duties existed. See O'Shea, p. 34.
As previously stated, Appellants were not required by Rule 35(a)(6) to
restate these facts and argument in successive sections of their brief where they also
applied. To do so would have been wasteful and excessive, particularly considering the
page limitations on an appellate brief. To require such repetition would be to elevate
procedure over substance to an unnecessary and unjust degree.
Appellants respectfully request that this Court rehear argument as to fraud
by nondisclosure, matters it previously refused to consider.
3.

The Appellants were not irrevocably bound to purchase the property

simply by sign_ing the Purchase and Sale Agreement; rather they retained all of theit:
contractual, legal and equitable rights upon a breach of the Agreement by High Mark
Development.
Regarding Appellants' fraud claims, this Court held that false
representations about the financial condition of the tenant made after the Trust had
entered into the contract could not form the basis of a fraud claim because (a) "the
contract did not provide that the Trust could terminate it if the Trust determined that the
tenant was not financially sound" and (b) the "Trust was already bound to purchase the
property before the alleged false representations were made." O'Shea, p. 4, 17.
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The Trust was not irrevocably "bound" to purchase the property after
signing the Purchase and Sale Agreement. The jury was instructed that the Estoppel
Certificate was not accurate. In other words, the remedy that, "[ s]hould the information
provided on the estoppel differ from the information provided by Seller, Buyer shall have
the option to terminate" would become operative at any time after the Purchase and Sale
Agreement was signed, had the Respondents disclosed accurate information regarding
rent payments. To hold otherwise would have made this remedy meaningless. The
combination of this particular remedy, and the instruction that the Estoppel Certificate
contained inaccurate information, weighed heavily in favor of a duty on the part of
Respondents to disclose the truth.
Most importantly, Paragraph 24 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement
provided as follows:
If SELLER defaults, having approved said sale and fails to
consummate the same as herein agreed, BUYER'S Earnest
Money deposit shall be returned to him/her and SELLER
shall pay for the costs of title insurance, escrow fees, credit
report fees, inspection fees, Brokerage fees and all attorney's
fees, if any. This shall not be considered as a waiver by
BUYER of any other lawful right or remedy to which
BUYER may be entitled,
See Exh. 5, p. 5 (emphasis added). To "consummate" commonly means "to bring to
completion[.]" AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, p. 286 (1969). High Mark certainly
could not comply with its obligations under the Agreement by providing false
information. R., p. 1168. Appellants therefore had the right, upon learning of the
misrepresentation, to "either rescind the contract and recover any payments made by him
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or her, or treat the contract as subsisting and sue the vendor in fraud and deceit for the
damages sustained." 77 AM. JUR. 20 Vendor and Purchaser § 531 (2006). Appellants
sought rescission or monetary damages in their Complaint, within their contractual, legal
and equitable rights.
Nowhere in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, or in the language quoted by
the Court, does it state that the Trust could not seek remedies in law or equity if it
subsequently learned of fraud or misrepresentations. This Court incorrectly limited
Appellants' rights under the Purchase and Sale Agreement, and should rehear argument
on this issue.
4.

The evidence showed that, hCLd they known the truth about the

tenant's rent history, Appellants would not have purchased the property.
This Court held that "[t]he jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiffs
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they would not have purchased the
property had they known of the nonpayment of rent[.]" 0' Shea, pp. 8-12. The Court
based its decision upon a finding that the Appellants did not inquire into losses the tenant
had experienced in the past or conduct an independent investigation, and were set on
completing a Section 1031 exchange within the time limitations required by law.
That decision is contrary to the Court's own precedent. Appellants were
entitled to rely upon the representations of the seller. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,
507, 112 P.3d 788 (2005); see also Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166
(2007). This was stated very clearly in the Estoppel Certificate:
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This certification is made with the knowledge that it
will be relied upon by the Purchaser, Purchaser's lender and
any successor or assignee of Purchaser's right to purchase the
Property in connection with financing and sales of the
Property and the purchase of the Property by the Purchaser.
Exh.25. Appellants did not know that the Estoppel Certificate or Income and Expense
Statement-both requested by the Appellants as part of the sale--contained inaccurate
statements regarding rent payments. Nevertheless, they had no duty to independently
investigate the truth. Watts v. Krebs, l31 Idaho 616, 621, 962 P.2d 387 (1998). Ifa
purchaser relies upon misleading facts and does not conduct his own independent
investigation, "he is entitled to relief from the seller's misrepresentation, whether made
fraudulently or not." Snow's Auto Supply, Inc. v. Dormaier, 108 Idaho 73, 78, 696 P.2d
924 (Ct. App. 1985). Appellants' reliance upon High Mark's statements and failure to
conduct additional investigation is not evidence that they would have purchased the
property even if they had known the truth.
The relevance of the nonpayment of rent was twofold. First, as the tenant's
biggest expense to the landlord, the jury could have only reasonably concluded that
disclosure of nonpayment of rent for several months prior to the purchase would have
been of critical importance to the Appellants, who were seeking an income-producing
property. Second, given the statements in the Estoppel Certificate concerning rent, upon
which all parties involved understood Appellants were relying, disclosure of significant
nonpayments would have indicated that Respondents had not been truthful. Appellants
purchased the property without a true understanding of the rent history. It is
unreasonable to conclude that they would have acted the same with a true understanding
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING - 14

of the rent history. The Appellants unequivocally testified at trial that they would not
have purchased the property had they known the truth. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-13.
No evidence to the contrary was presented.
Finally, this Court incolTectly held that the jury could have found that
misrepresentations were not the cause of the Appellants' damages because the tenant's
ultimate failure was due to factors out of Respondents' control. O'Shea, p. 13. Even if
the reasons stated by the Court were indeed the cause of the tenant's ultimate demise, this
had no effect on the right of the Appellants to rely upon the misrepresentations
concerning the payment of rent.
Appellants may well have been satisfied with the financial information
given to them by Respondents. O'Shea, p. 12. Little did they know that it was
inaccurate. Had they the truth regarding the non-payment of rent, the facts and their
testimony at trial showed that Appellants would not have purchased the property. This
Comt should rehear matters conceming causation.
5.

This Court shoutd have, at !he very least..remanded this matter to the

trial court to properly separate its analysis of JNOV and new trial.
"[I]t is essential that if an alternative motion for a new trial is made with the
motion for judgment n.o.v., the trial court must rule on both motions separately." Quick
v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). "On a motion for a new trial, the
court has broad discretion. On a motion for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v., it has no
discretion and must consider only the question of law whether there is sufficient evidence
to raise a jury issue. On a motion for a new trial the court weighs the evidence and the
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credibility of the witnesses. On a motion for a directed verdict or for judgment n.o.v., it
does not." Id. at 766.
These very different standards of review required the trial court to
separately analyze the JNOV and new trial motions. The trial court did not do so. The
same standards were announced at the outset of each claim, the evidence was presented
only once, and then the C0U11 made two rulings on two different motions in one sentence
following the discussion of the evidence. The trial court impermissibly, improperly and
unfairly combined its analyses of the Appellants' motions.
On the new trial motion, the trial court failed to properly weigh all the
evidence, instead focusing exclusively on evidence presented by the Respondents. The
trial court did not mention any evidence presented by the Appellants at trial in its
analysis. On appeal, this Court's analysis likewise did not show that the trial court
considered any of the Appellants' evidence in deciding the new trial motion. O'Shea, p.
18.
This Court should rehear whether the trial court erred in its analysis of the
post-trial motions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants' Petition for Rehearing should be
granted.
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DATED this

~-"""'-

of May, 2012.
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC

By _ _---"'-_ _.
C. Timothy Hopkins

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY,
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and correct
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail,
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission.
DATED this - -

Richard J. Armstrong, Esq.
Kirton McConkie, PC
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 11

of May, 2012.

IIIl

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Email
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